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House prices and rents have increased ahead of average earnings over the last 25 years tipping more 
and more Australian households into housing affordability stress. The percentage of households in 
the bottom 40% of the income distribution whose housing costs exceed 30% of their income rose 
from 15% to 20% between 1982 and 2007
1
. Population increases, deregulation of mortgage 
markets, buoyant labour markets and inflexible planning systems are all likely to have played a role. 
But underpinning an inflationary bias in residential property markets is a set of Federal and State 
tax arrangements that distort the use of land and buildings in ways that impair the efficient 
operation of housing markets. 
 
Federal income tax arrangements exempt both net imputed rents
2
 and capital gains on owner 
occupied housing thereby offering a preferential tax treatment as compared to other personal assets.  
This results in a powerful incentive to accumulate savings in owner occupied housing, a motive that 
is sharpened by asset tests determining eligibility for pensions (and allowances) that exempt owner 
occupied housing (Yates, 2009). These Federal tax expenditures tend to favour higher income 
households in later stages of the life cycle (Wood et al 2010b). While they have come to be 
regarded as an important pillar of retirement incomes policy (see Castles, 1998), their inequitable 
distribution is the source of much criticism (Bourassa and Hendershott, 1994; Freebairn, 1999; 
Yates and Flood, 1987; Yates, 1994). 
 
The state governments’ taxation of residential land and buildings has not attracted the same scrutiny 
but is arguably as inefficient and inequitable as Federal taxation arrangements. There are two main 
                                                            
1 The figures are population weighted estimates derived from the confidentialised unit record files of the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 1982 and 2007 Surveys of Income and Housing. 
2
 Net imputed rents are the gross rental value of owner occupied housing less costs of holding the property such as 
interest and operating costs.  
tax instruments
3
. Stamp duties must be met by the purchasers of residential property and are levied 
on purchase price, with marginal rates of duty that rise across purchase price brackets. Most states 
provide some form of relief for first-homebuyers although the extent of, and eligibility for such 
relief varies depending on the jurisdiction. The duty schedules can also differ depending upon 
whether the housing has been purchased as a principal residence or rental investment. Duty 
schedules in the latter case impose a higher tax burden, giving a financial advantage to home 
owners relative to landlords.  
 
State governments also levy land taxes on the unimproved capital value
4
 of residential land, but 
exempt land used for owner occupied housing and these arrangements also favour home owners 
relative to landlords. Typically state governments zero rate land below a value threshold, and then 
apply a progressive schedule with marginal rates that increase with assessed land values. An 
important feature of land tax arrangements is measurement of the tax base on a cumulative basis. 
Thus multiple property owners are taxed on the cumulative value of the land plots that their 
properties occupy, rather than on the value of each individual plot of land.  
 
Tax receipts from stamp duties and land tax are an important source of revenue for state 
governments. For example, in Victoria in 2010 –‘11 they amounted to $5.3b or 35% of total tax 
revenue
5
. Understandably there is a reluctance to introduce reforms that threaten this revenue base. 
This reluctance has persisted despite considerable expressed dissatisfaction with stamp duties on 
residential property transactions.  For example, at the recent Australian Government Tax Forum, the 
weight of opinion favoured the removal of such transaction taxes.  
 
Indeed, the Henry Review believed the case for reform was strong enough to warrant the following 
key recommendations (51 to 54) (see Henry et al 2009):  
 the abolition of stamp duties on all property transactions;  
 the levying of land tax on all land;  
 levying land tax using an increasing marginal rate schedule applied to unimproved capital 
values, with the lowest rate being zero and thresholds determined according to per m
2
 value 
in order to tax more valuable land at higher rates; 
 levying land tax on a per land holding basis, not on an entity’s total holding, to promote 
investment in land development. 
 
The introduction of such measures would radically alter state government taxation of land and 
buildings. This paper analyses the case for reform, and assesses what impact their introduction 
would have upon land prices based on modelling of the Melbourne housing market. In section two 
we outline the range of issues the Henry reforms raise for the efficient operation of housing and 
land markets, with an emphasis on their implications for housing affordability. Section three reports 
findings from a modelling exercise that designs a broad based land tax schedule to offset the 
revenue lost on removing stamp duties and replacing the existing land tax. The formal incidence of 
land taxes is computed, and capitalisation effects into land prices are estimated. As ever, tax 
reforms create winners and losers so in Section four we reflect upon the extent to which the Tax 
Forum created any momentum for reform and  consider what transitional arrangements might 
address impediments to reform.  
 
2 The Case for Reform 
                                                            
3 Local governments are responsible for rates but might more properly be regarded as a user charge. 
4 Unimproved capital value is the assessed market value of land in the use that maximises value, but excluding the value 
of buildings that have been constructed on the land. Unimproved capital value can include the value of ‘merged 
improvements such as drainage, mains water connection and so on.  
5
 Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance, 2011-’12 Budget Paper Number 5, Statement of Finances. These 
estimates are for revenue generated from both residential and non-residential property and land.  
 
Stamp Duties 
The discussions leading to the Henry Review recommendations would no doubt have aired a range 
of concerns about stamp duties relating to their rationale, and the potential detrimental impacts on 
residential mobility, housing affordability and efficient use of the housing stock. A rationale for 
transaction (excise) taxes such as stamp duty can be that a good or service is responsible for 
incidental side effects (externalities) that negatively impact community wellbeing. A transaction 
tax, it is argued, will raise the tax-inclusive price, reduce the quantity traded, and hence curb 
negative side effects. But there is no obvious reason why property should be thought to solely  
generate negative externalities; indeed housing is, if anything, linked to positive externalities such 
as health benefits (see Rohe, McCarthy, and Van Zndt, 2000; McCarthy, Van Zndt, and Rohe, 
2001).  
 
A second possible rationale is that a tax can play an important redistributive role; but while higher 
income households typically pay more for housing, demand tends to be income inelastic and so 
stamp duties can be regressive (see Wood, 1994). Stamp duties are also thought responsible for 
negative effects in housing and labour markets. They impede access to home ownership as it is a 
transaction cost that needs to be paid upfront upon purchase of a property (Bourassa and Yin 2006; 
Wood et al. 2006). Additionally they can have adverse impacts on housing affordability because 
they raise the price of housing
6
. Finally, there are efficiency concerns. Stamp duty is a tax on 
mobility and to the extent that it deters residential moves the duty is an added friction impairing the 
smooth functioning of labour markets (Henry et al 2009; Yates 2010). This is an issue of particular 
relevance to labour shortages in resource boom regions of Australia.  Reduced mobility is also 
problematic in housing markets because it slows the transfer of property from lower value uses to 
higher value uses, and results in an inefficient allocation of resources in housing markets. This is 
most evident in terms of underutilisation of the housing stock, where households that may be 
consuming large amounts of housing (e.g. ‘empty nesters’) are deterred from trading down as a 






The Henry Review would undoubtedly have encountered similar efficiency concerns when 
considering land taxes, for current land tax arrangements also introduce inefficiency into housing 
markets by distorting the allocation of land between alternative uses.  Land taxes also make housing 
less affordable in rental markets. Both these impacts arise because land used for owner occupied 
housing (as well as primary production, and certain other uses such as education) is exempt from 
land tax, while land used for private rental housing (and commercial or industrial uses) is subject to 
land tax. 
 
When a tax is applied conditional on the use of a factor input (land, labour or capital) in production, 
the resource will flow out of the types of production that are taxed and into the untaxed uses. This is 
because the after- tax returns in the taxed use decline on introduction of the tax; the resource 
transfer continues until the after-tax returns are equalized. In a land market where land is only used 
for rental or owner occupied housing, the taxation of the former will then result in a contraction in 
                                                            
6 Economic theory demonstrates that the tax (duty) inclusive price of housing increases, but by less than the full amount 
of the tax. On the other hand, the after-tax price received by vendors will fall, though by less than the full amount of the 
tax, and so the effective incidence is shared between buyers and sellers (see Freebairn, 2010, figure 7.1).  
7 It also has the incidental effect of eroding the welfare role of housing wealth as stamp duty eats into the equity 
released when home owners trade down. The stamp duty impacts on both residential mobility and the price (and hence 
affordability) of housing are formally analysed in Freebairn (2010, figure 7.2)  
 
 
the supply of rental housing, as some rental investors seek higher returns elsewhere, and an increase 
in rents. Thus the current land tax arrangements harm the supply of affordable rental housing, and 
this is aggravated by its application to the cumulative unimproved value of land that impedes 
attraction of private finance (from superannuation funds, for instance) into the private rental 
housing market (Wood et al 2010a). 
 
Figure 1 substantiates some of these propositions in a more formal setting where it is assumed that 
‘raw’ land has only two uses – the production of housing for purchase by home buyers, or 
alternatively the production of housing that is purchased by landlords (and subsequently leased to 
tenants)
8
. There is a fixed amount of land measured on the horizontal axis from O to S; rents are 
measured on the vertical axis
9
. Land used by producers of housing for owner occupiers (rental 
housing) is measured along the horizontal from left to right (right to left), and beginning at O (S). 
Denote OO as the demand for land from producers (developers) of owner occupied housing; as the 
amount of land used increases the rent they are prepared to pay owners of land declines (since in 
order to attract more home buyers they must drop the price of new housing). PP is the demand for 
land from producers (developers) of rental housing; again the demand curve is downward sloping. 
Owners of land have a fixed reservation rent equal to A, which can be thought of as its value in 
agricultural use. In a market where land is not taxed producers will compete and outbid each other 
until the rents they are prepared to pay for the last unit of land used are equal at R0. This 
equilibrium rent occurs at X, with OX (SX) land used by producers of owner occupied (rental) 
housing. 
 
Suppose a flat tax t per unit of land is imposed on land used for rental housing but a tax exemption 
is granted to land that has been purchased for the construction of housing purchased by home 
owners. This reduces the rent received by landowners (who formally pay the tax) from producers of 
rental housing by t, so they begin to lease more land to the developers of owner occupied housing 
until (after-tax) rents are equalized at X1. The pre-tax rents R2 paid by developers of rental housing 
are higher, and the amount of land used for production of rental housing shrinks from X to X1.  
Externalities and other causes of market failure can justify departures from a ‘level playing field’. 
But it is difficult to understand what market failure justifies preferential tax treatment for land used 


















                                                            
8 The analysis draws on Evans (2004, chapters 2 and 17). 
9 In a perfectly informed market without frictions such as transaction cost, the capital value of land will equal the 
present value of rents. As Oates and Schwab (2009, p.55) point out a land tax can be applied to land rents or land 
values, and every tax rate on land rents can be expressed as an equivalent rate on land value that generates the same tax 




Figure 1: Land tax and housing markets 
 
 
Current land tax arrangements will then harm the supply of affordable rental housing and inflate the 
rents tenants are obliged to pay for rental housing. But there will also be capitalisation impacts on 
land prices. In an efficient market with perfect foresight land prices will equal the net present value 
of the future stream of after-tax rents (see Henry Review, p248-250 and Oates and Schwab, 2009, 
p52 - 53). In the new equilibrium illustrated in Figure 1 the producers of owner occupied housing 
pay rents equal to R1; the producers of rental housing pay higher pre-tax rents R2 but the after-tax 
rents received by landowners are again R1. The post-tax equilibrium rents received by landowners 
are then lower than R0 the pre-tax equilibrium rents. These lower rents will be capitalised into lower 
land prices. 
 
A broad based land tax that is uniformly applied avoids the distortionary effects resulting from the 
current non-tenure neutral provisions, and leaves tenants unaffected according to the analysis taken 
up in figure 2. It assumes a flat per unit tax t applied uniformly to both land used for rental and 
owner occupied housing. The respective demand curves OO and PP shift downward by the amount 
t. As figure 2 demonstrates a parallel shift in both curves of distance t leaves the amount of land 
used by developers of rental and owner occupied housing unchanged, and the rents paid by 
developers are also unchanged. As both must pay the same tax, the rents they are willing to pay 
owners of land will stay the same all else remaining constant. A broad based tax is tenure neutral 
according to this static analysis. The tax burden is shifted to landowners who receive lower after-tax 
rents R1 that will be capitalised into lower land prices. This is clearly an appealing outcome from 
the perspectives of all but landowners at the time the tax is introduced. Developers are unaffected 
because they continue to pay the same for land as before the tax, and if the industry is competitive, 
the entire tax will be shifted backward to landowners rather than forward to home buyers and 
tenants. As the after-tax rents received by landowners fall by t the price of land will fall by the 
discounted present value of the future stream of tax liabilities. There are potentially important 

















figure 1) the supply of private rental housing expands (from S-X1 to S-X) and the fall in pre-tax 
land rents (R2 to R0) will (if markets are competitive) be shifted forwards, thereby lowering tenants’ 
housing cost burdens. 
 
Figure 2: A broad based land tax 
 
  
The analysis presented in figures 1and 2 allow us to draw the following conclusions regarding 
incidence and housing affordability. Removing stamp duties will lower the price of housing, and 
help relax home buyer borrowing constraints. Replacing current land tax arrangements by a broad 
based flat rate land tax will improve the supply of rental housing, and lower rent burdens thus 
easing housing affordability in a tenure that offers shelter services to many low income households. 
Home buyers will also find housing more affordable; though land tax liabilities offset the lower 
land and housing prices due to capitalisation effects, the removal of stamp duty will also reduce the 
price of housing, thereby providing a net affordability gain for home buyers. To these benefits we 
can add efficiency gains as stamp duties are an impediment to mobility and encourage an 
underutilisation of the housing stock. Furthermore, if land tax is applied uniformly at a flat rate, a 
more efficient pattern of land use will emerge, as compared to current arrangements which distort 
land use patterns in ways that have no compelling market failure rationale. Finally, a broad based 
land tax will speed development of vacant sites where developers’ binding liquidity constraints 
prompt them to accelerate construction plans. To the extent that this effect is significant, a more 
compact urban form will be encouraged. However, owners of land (including home owners) at the 
time tax reforms are introduced will suffer capital losses, an issue that we return to when discussing 
transition arrangements below. Finally, a broad based land tax might prove to the source of a more 
stable revenue stream than that currently generated by stamp duties.
10
    
 
                                                            
10 The current narrow land tax base appears to generate a revenue stream that is just as volatile as that yielded by stamp duties. For 
example, Victorian annual land tax revenue between 1996-97 and 2010-11 ranged from a maximum of $1,398 million to a low of 
$325 million, with a coefficient of variation equal to 0.44. Victorian annual stamp duty revenue ranged from a maximum of $3,910 
million to a low of $981 million, with a coefficient of variation equal to 0.43 over the same period (authors’ calculations from the 
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3  A Broad Based Land Tax 
 
The theoretical analysis in section 2 imagines a setting where the housing stock is auctioned under 
different tax arrangements that can be instantaneously substituted. The incidence under these 
alternative arrangements is then compared as if we could conduct such an experiment. But the 
reality is that reform must be enacted in housing markets where existing home owners have already 
paid stamp duty on their property purchases. A proposal to replace stamp duty with a broad based 
land tax will (in the absence of transitional arrangements)  impose an additional tax on existing 
home owners, who will also suffer a decline in land (and hence house) values.  
 
It is then important to estimate the typical land tax liabilities (and decline in land values) that 
existing home owners would be asked to pay if the Henry Review proposals are introduced.      
In this section, we describe these land tax burdens, as hypothetically levied in Melbourne, one of 
Australia’s largest cities, and compare the new tax burdens with liabilities under existing tax 
arrangements. We design a revenue neutral broad based land tax that would broadly align with the 
principles outlined under recommendations 51 to 54 of the Henry Review (see page 2 above).  
Our analysis is based on two key data sources. The first estimates the revenue foregone in 
Melbourne municipalities if stamp duties and the existing land tax regime were abolished. Using 
Victorian Office of Valuer-General data on 68,400 residential property sales transactions conducted 
in metropolitan Melbourne in 2006, we estimate that $1.29 billion of tax revenue would be lost if 
stamp duty were abolished. According to the Commonwealth Grants Commission (2007), state-
wide non-principal residential land generated $279 million in land taxes in 2006. 77.5% of private 
renter dwellings in Victoria are located in Melbourne (based on 2006 data from the nationally 
representative Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey), suggesting a revenue 
loss of $216 million due to abolition of the current land tax regime. The total revenue foregone 
would therefore be $1.5 billion.  
 
The second component of our analysis involves utilising 1,136,000 records from the Victorian 
Office of Valuer - General’s valuations data to estimate land tax assessments on residential 
properties under the Henry Review’s proposed reforms. The new land tax schedule is revenue 
neutral, i.e. land value thresholds are set so as to raise enough revenue to compensate for the loss of 
stamp duty and current land tax revenue.  We assume that there are seven land tax brackets (as is 
the case under the current system), and the same distribution of land plots across brackets as there is 




Table 1 presents the new land tax schedule. Column 1 details the land tax brackets based on the 
land value per m
2. 
There is a tax exemption below a land value per m
2
 threshold of $286.54
12
. 
Column 2 lists the number of land plots in each of the land tax brackets. Column 3 shows how the 
marginal tax rates rise in a linear fashion from 0.9% to 1.4% in the top bracket. The top marginal 
rate cuts in once land values (per m
2
) reach $5697.08. As we move up the tax brackets, the rates rise 
by 0.09 percentage points. Column 4 details the average annual land tax liability for each tax 
bracket. The overall average is $1,458
13
. Column 5 shows the dollar value of revenue would be 
generated from each tax bracket and column 6 the percentage of total revenue. Over 50% of 
landowners are in the second tax bracket and could expect to pay an average land tax liability of 
$1,306 per annum. These tax liabilities account for 2.7% and 2.4% of the median household 
disposable income as computed for Melbourne households in 2006
14
. 
                                                            
11
 The land tax estimates are based on assessments of unimproved land values.  
12
 All dollar values for tax thresholds and tax liabilities are at 2006 prices. 
13 The land tax liability would be equivalent to $2,164 in 2011 prices if indexed according to the Melbourne house price 
index movements produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
14 The median Melbourne household income in 2006 is $53,325, based on population weighted income estimates from 
the 2006 Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. 
 
More than half of revenue is generated from the second lowest tax bracket and 84% from the 
second and third lowest tax brackets. The revenue generated by each successively higher bracket 
quickly tails off. Under 2% of total tax revenue is raised in the highest bracket despite high average 
land value per m
2
; this is because there is a very small amount of land with such high values 








Table 1: Proposed land tax schedule
 












Less than $286.54 305,166 0.00% $0 $0 0% 
$286.54 to less than $974.45 593,904 0.92% $1,306 $776 51% 
$974.45 to less than $2000.22 104,152 1.01% $4,839 $504 33% 
$2000.22 to less than $3025.30 19,197 1.10% $6,600 $127 8% 
$3025.30 to less than $4145.28 6,907 1.19% $8,004 $55 4% 
$4145.28 to less than $5697.08 3,075 1.28% $9,367 $29 2% 
$5697.08 and over 790 1.37% $20,342 $16 1% 
Total 1,033,191  $1,458 $1,507 100% 
 
On considering the spatial impacts of this new land tax schedule we find the impact will vary across 
the city because of substantial variation in per m
2
 land values that typically decline as distance from 
the CBD increases. In Table 2, we report land tax measures at progressively more distant 10 km 
concentric rings around the CBD. The table also describes typical stamp duty liabilities across the 
same concentric rings thereby giving a sense of how net tax burdens will change across the city. 
There is a radical change in spatial incidence with land tax burdens concentrated in the inner ring of 
business districts and suburbs. For example, almost half of the land tax revenue is raised from 
residential land plots within 10 km of the CBD, where land is most expensive (a mean value of 
$1,335 per m
2
). But less than one third of stamp duty revenue is levied from property transactions 
within the same 10 km ring. On the other hand, the tax burden will be lower on the urban fringe 
where land is comparatively cheaper at around $300 per m
2
. Our findings show that the formal 
incidence of the broad-based land tax will be felt most keenly where pressure on land use is most 
acute. This is in part due to progressive marginal rates of land tax; land with higher per m
2
 values 
attract a higher marginal rate of land tax. By recommending a progressive instead of flat rate 
schedule, the Henry Review recommendations could miss the opportunity to encourage a more 
compact urban form. Owners of land in the more expensive inner suburbs can sell up and buy land 
of equal value on the urban fringe thereby lowering their land tax liabilities. On the other hand, the 
higher land tax rates on expensive inner area vacant land might speed development as developers 
find liquidity constraints tightened by their higher land tax liabilities. 
 





Proposed land tax 
 
Stamp duty 
Aggregate revenue Total 





($ per m2) 






($ million) (%) ($ million) (%) 
0km < 10km 686 46% 89 1,335 302 29% 8,375 684 
10km < 20km 572 38% 238 553 327  32% 14,194 459 
20km < 30km 152 10% 179 377 173  17% 11,530 323 
30km < 40km 34 2% 107 278 87 8% 7,217 272 
40km < 50km 29 2% 65 309 73 7% 4,926 318 
50km < 60km 12 1% 27 295 26  3% 1,811 312 
60km < 70km 20 1% 36 310 35         3% 2,141 342 
70km <  2 0.2% 3 318 2  0.2% 128 356 
Total 1,507 100% 744 576 1,025
a 100% 50,322 414 
Note: a. The aggregate amount of revenue generated by stamp duty ($1.025 billion) is less than the amount generated by 
the proposed land tax schedule because approximately 25% of stamp duty transactions in the VG data could not be 
matched to their property characteristics in the Valuation data.  
 
An important question is whether this increasingly unequal geographical distribution of the tax 
burden turns out to be more equitable because it requires better off communities to shoulder more of 
the tax burden. We have analysed the formal incidence of land tax and stamp duties across local 
government areas (LGAs). We find that per capita land taxes are much higher in LGAs where 
income per capita is correspondingly high
15
. The relationship is a strong one with a correlation 
coefficient (between per capita land tax and per capita income) exceeding 0.8. The better off 
communities will then pay more.  
 
Turning now to the impact on land prices, as land is immobile and its supply fixed, existing 
landowners bear the burden of a broad-based land tax in the form of a reduction in land values (see 
figure 2). Assuming an infinite property life and a 2006 pattern of land taxes that remains constant 
in real terms, discounting the stream of land taxes to infinity at a suitably chosen real discount rate
16
 
allows estimation of the decline in real land values as a result of the capitalisation of land taxes (see 
Henry Review, p.248)
17
. The estimated fall in land values if taxes are fully passed on into lower 
land values is analysed spatially across the Melbourne metropolitan area.  
 
We find that the average plot with a land value of $335,000 (at 2006 prices) will decline by 
$24,000, or approximately 5%. However, the expected decline in land value will be greatest in 
those suburbs in and around the CBD (at around 12%), where land is currently most expensive. The 
12% reduction in average land values will make housing closest to the CBD, where jobs are still 
concentrated (see Tsutsumi, 2006), more affordable for those seeking to locate closer to 
employment opportunities in the city. However, in suburbs further away from the CBD, the 
percentage decline in mean land value will be lower. Within the 60-70km ring, the percentage 
decline in mean land value is only 3%. These estimates are conservative because they do not 
include estimates of the fall in land and house values that will eventuate due to the elimination of 
stamp duties. Their inclusion will mean that owner occupied housing is more affordable under the 
proposed reforms, since the aggregate fall in house prices will exceed the capitalised value of land 
tax payments.   
 
Table 3: Reduction in mean land values due to the proposed land tax, by distance from CBD (10km ring) 
Distance from 
CBD (10km ring) 
Mean Assessed 
Land Value $ 
 
Mean Reduction in Land 
Value due to 
Capitalisation $ 
% Decrease in Mean 
Land Value after 
Capitalisation 
                                                            
15 Income estimates are taken from BITRE’s (2007) estimates of 2004-05 taxable income per taxpayer, inflated to 2006 
prices using the Consumer Price Index. Taxpayers are Federal income taxpayers. Land tax per taxpayer by LGA is 
derived by dividing each LGA’s aggregate land tax revenue by the number of Federal income taxpayers in each LGA. 
16 The Victorian state government recommends a real discount rate of 6% in economic appraisals (Department of 
Infrastructure, 2005). 
17 Full capitalisation can be assumed under a flat rate land tax such as that analysed in figure 2. The estimates in table 3 
should be regarded as a guide to impacts on land values since the Henry Review recommends a progressive rate 
structure. The broad based land tax will not be neutral when applied non-uniformly. This is because land holders in 
inner suburbs where land is expensive can sell up and buy land of exactly the land value in cheaper outer suburbs but 
with lower land tax burdens.  With a flat rate tax reinvestment of land sale proceeds in the purchase of land in cheaper 
suburbs leaves land tax burdens unchanged.    
0km < 10km 551,099 65,657.80 12% 
10km < 20km 365,163 27,411.82 8% 
20km < 30km 257,852 10,561.33 4% 
30km < 40km 196,434 4,322.37 2% 
40km < 50km 245,891 6,686.88 3% 
50km < 60km 238,185 6,977.59 3% 
60km < 70km 271,739 8,940.75 3% 
  70km  319,904 14,681.14 5% 
Total 334,877 24,311.09 5% 
 
4 The Tax Forum and the Politics of Property Tax Reform 
 
It is undoubtedly a marker of significant progress in national housing policy debate that the issue of 
housing affordability was prominent throughout the Tax Forum. Only four years ago, in a national 
policy forum on housing affordability, discussion of tax reform was at best marginal, at worst 
‘radical’ – a fringe topic.  That the national Tax Forum highlighted the importance of tax reform for 
housing affordability is significant. That speakers from a diverse range of sectoral interests 
recognised the benefits of such reforms, suggests that not only are these tax reforms on the agenda 
but with some State Treasurers present at the Tax Forum acknowledging the benefits of these 
reforms, there is some likelihood of this agenda being advanced, providing the right set of 
transitional arrangements can be agreed. . 
 
The logic would seem inescapable. If Australia seeks: 
i. downward pressure upon house prices; 
ii. faster redevelopment of old industrial sites; 
iii. easier entry to home ownership for first home buyers; 
iv. increased supply of private rental accommodation; 
v. a reduction in the number of taxes (by one), and; 
vi. removal of a barrier to labour mobility; 
then it would remove stamp duties on residential property transactions whilst extending land tax to 
owner occupiers, applying it on a per property basis. 
 
What might bring the opportunity for reform closer still is a set of transitional arrangements that 
‘smooth the path’ for potential losers. As much as the main ‘winners’ of these reforms are those 
currently unable to afford home ownership and tenants paying rents higher than necessary, key 
amongst the ‘losers’ are existing home owners. Not only do these reforms place downward pressure 
on house prices, we estimate an average 5% decline in land values (see page 10), but if the proposed 
reforms were introduced overnight existing home owners would likely decry the impost of an 
annual land tax on their property (estimated to be on average $1458), having already paid a stamp 
duty at the time of purchase. This is particularly important for elderly home owners whose 
retirement incomes are insufficient to meet land tax payments, and/or plan to release housing equity 
to fund post-retirement living standards. 
 
How might this be addressed? If properties were moved from the current stamp duty regime to the 
new land tax regime as they were sold, then no current home owner would pay land tax on a 
property for which they had already paid stamp duty.
18
  Since no stamp duty is paid on that next 
purchase current home owners would have an upfront transaction tax replaced by a recurrent annual 
tax when they next purchase.  The timing of that substitution would be at the discretion of current 
home owners; our modelling indicates that the typical homeowner will on moving begin paying an 
average annual land tax of $1458 instead of an average up-front stamp duty of $18,900 (at 2006 
prices). One might argue that this discretionary substitution will adversely affect mobility because 
current home owners can defer paying land taxes by not moving. However, under current tax 
                                                            
18 Those transitioning from renting into home ownership also begin paying land tax once they make their purchase.    
arrangements, home owners can avoid stamp duty by not moving. So the proposed transitional 
arrangements that remove upfront stamp duty on the next purchase and then replace it by an annual 
land tax, should at least be neutral with respect to residential mobility. After all, instead of paying a 
high upfront charge, home buyers are instead spreading this out over their term of ownership. 
 
Table 4 below sheds some light on how quickly a broad based land tax could be introduced for 
existing owner occupied housing under such transition arrangements. It shows the number of 
Australian homeowners in 2001 who moved house subsequently through to 2009. Under the 
proposed transitional arrangements as each property is sold it would then be included in the new 
land tax base. It shows that nearly 30% of the 2001 stock of owner occupied housing becomes 
subject to land tax by 2009. 
 
Existing owner occupied housing is of course only part of the housing stock. There is also privately 
rented housing on which landlords are already paying land tax but under the existing land tax 
schedule. If the same transition arrangements apply then landlord owned properties would also 
transition into the new land tax base when they are next sold. The speed of transition on this part of 
the stock is likely to be faster. We estimate that one in four landlords holding a rental property 
between 2001 and 2006 sold their rental property within one year of first being observed as a rental 
investor (see Wood and Ong, 2011). A further consideration is newly constructed housing. If it 
transitions into the reformed tax base on purchase by home buyers (or investors) then all new 
additions to the housing stock automatically form part of the new tax base, and this will aid 
introduction of the new arrangements.    
 
Table 4 
Year y Homeowners in 2001 who moved for the first time in year y 
 Number (population weighted) % 
2002 325,737 5.8 
2003 357,133 6.1 
2004 273,864 4.5 
2005 213,356 3.4 
2006 195,063 3.1 
2007 169,344 2.6 
2008 140,997 2.1 
2009 119,143 1.8 
All 1,794,636 29.4 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from the 2001-2009 HILDA Survey 
Note the unit of analysis below is the person. Ideally we would want to track households / dwellings over time but we 
are unable to do that in HILDA. HILDA does not contain a unique household ID or dwelling ID that is the same across 
waves. 
 
The transition of the housing stock onto a new land tax regime will clearly be a gradual one taking a 
number of years. A significant advantage of such gradual transition arrangements is that they would 
guard against the possible disruption in land and housing markets that might be triggered by the 
‘overnight’ replacement of stamp duty by a broad based land tax.  The importance of avoiding 
disruption to housing and land markets in a country where the national ‘dream’ is home ownership 
hardly needs stating. The fact that over two thirds of households are home owners and that home 
ownership comprises such a significant part of household wealth means that there is considerable 
merit in transition arrangements that allow for an orderly progression over time, at a pace controlled 
by home owners themselves. 
 
However, a potential disadvantage of the gradual transition arrangements for state governments is 
the shortfall in their revenue stream through the transition period.  The more gradual the transition 
to a broad based land tax, the greater the shortfall in tax revenue to a state government in the 
interim. Given the importance of stamp duty as a source of revenue for state governments, it would 
be unreasonable to expect them to simply forego such revenue. 
 
In a Federation where taxation powers and service provision are shared across levels of 
government, the community expects our governments to act in concert on tax reform matters. 
Notions of separate ‘Commonwealth taxes’ or ‘State taxes’ that are their business alone to reform 
hold little sway, particularly when the majority of tax revenues go to the Federal Government. 
There has to be negotiation and co-operation across governments when it comes to tax reform, and 
there is clearly a role for the Federal Government to assist in meeting the revenue shortfall that state 
govenments would experience in a gradual transition to a broad based land tax. Emerging from the 
Tax Forum is a state tax reform plan to be developed by Treasurers Baird and Fraser through the 
Council of Australia Federation and, subject to agreement, to then be discussed by the Council of 
Australian Governments. Whilst the Federal Treasurer has indicated the Commonwealth is not in a 
position to fund state tax reform through increases to the GST or a state income tax, this should not 
prevent funding by the Commonwealth of time-limited, transitional funds. Such expenditure will do 
far more to improve housing affordability than the billions of dollars that have been spent on 
programs such as first home owner grants.  
 
Moreover, this particular tax reform package offers both equity and efficiency gains; and this is 
uncommon. The reform package is one of the few opportunities where more efficient operation of 
housing and land markets can be achieved, while at the same time improving housing affordability 
for future generations of Australians, and in particular low income Australians. These are objectives 
consistent with Federal and State government policy objectives as expressed by their joint National 
Affordable Housing Agreement. Failure to act on these issues will make it more difficult for 
Australians to achieve the ‘great Australian dream’ of home ownership. The reform package is an 
opportunity for the current generation of Australians to bequeath to future generations a housing 
system with improved levels of affordability.  
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